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Non-Self and Ethics: Kantian and Buddhist Themes
Are persons best understood as a series of happenings, or as having a kind of unity that merits
the appellation “self”?  Or to put the question another way:  Is the self explainable entirely by
reference to temporal units constitutive of it, or are these units better understood as temporal parts
of a whole?  In recent discussions of the nature of the self in Western philosophy, the distinction
between constructionist and non-constructionist views marks these two options.1  A constructionist
like Derek Parfit argues that because the self is not united over time in any deep metaphysical way,
it is not real, and a person is just the subject of experiences.2  This view of persons is said to have
moral implications because if persons aren’t discrete wholes but merely a series of happenings, then
it seems arbitrary to privilege the happenings in one series rather than another.  It is morally
problematic to concern myself with my own future states over others’ future states; they are not
really mine.  
Christine Korsgaard, a non-constructionist, challenges Parfit’s un-argued assumption, that
it is only legitimate to treat future experiences as mine, and so serving as reasons for me, if
1 As Marya Schechtman puts it:  “Constructionist accounts view persons as
constructs out of temporal parts, while non-constructionist accounts see these parts as
abstractions from a unifed person.” In “Diversity in unity: practical unity and personal
boundaries,” Synthese, 162(3), 2008, 405-423, 406 .
2 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons.  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 223.
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metaphysically authorized.3  Her Kantian position, acknowledging the significance of the practical
standpoint denies that we are forced by the dictates of metaphysics to give up on the pragmatic unity
of the self.  Selves, she argues, are united by the unavoidable activity of practical reason; in
deliberative choice we ask ourselves how to proceed and in doing so we adopt reasons for action and
simultaneously create a (more or less) united self.  There are practical reasons for regarding myself
as the same person who will occupy my body in the future: in order to act, it is practically necessary
that I identify with some inclinations and not others, and in so doing I forge a connection between
present and future selves.  The unavoidable standpoint of choice thus provides grounds for
commitment to a unified sense of self over time; the experience of deliberative choice is not the
experience of something happening to oneself.  One’s reasons are themselves expressions of value
that shape and connect present and future selves.  Self-creation of this sort is simply a consequence
of our nature as practically rational beings.
This distinction in Western philosophy’s analysis of the self can also be seen in discussions
of Buddhist views of the self which seem to be based on, or reject, an entirely metaphysical analysis
of the nature of the self.  In the next section, I will make a case that a distinction of this sort underlies
two ways of understanding the doctrine of no-self: as a contemplative strategy, and as a metaphysical
fact.  I will not defend one view over the other, though I will offer some support for the
contemplative strategy interpretation, aligning it with the practical standpoint.  I will argue that
within Kant’s accounts of the self and ethics, we find something like the contemplative strategy in
his duty of self-knowledge and his recognition of the existential significance of the individual’s
3 Christine Korsgaard, “Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian
response to Parfit,” in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends.  (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 363-397, 371.
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struggle to see and understand herself clearly.  I will conclude by taking up some objections
grounded in the claim that the Kantian emphasis on agency is inimical to the no-self doctrine.  I hope
to demonstrate that comparative studies of the nature of the self and ethics should go beyond
metaphysics to address the standpoint of the agent who must choose how to think and act.  Once we
bring to the comparative project the relevance of the standpoint of action, Kantian affinities are
illuminated, as are under-discussed aspects of Buddhist moral psychology.   
I.  No-Self and Norms within Buddhist Thought
In all versions of Buddhist philosophy the nature of the self is a fundamental philosophical
teaching, often drawn upon to understand practical matters, including how we should conceive of
and respond to particular situations.  The doctrine of no-self is the view that there is no self that is
permanent, unchanging, or that identifies the essence of a person.  The Pali Canon’s “Anatta-
lakkhana Sutta”4 defends a form of anti-essentialism by pointing out that the five aggregates that
constitute the basic parts of a person are impermanent, cannot be controlled, and so do not provide
evidence of a stable self and thus cannot properly be considered “mine”.  What appears to us as a self
is multiply conditioned by other factors, and so the belief in an essential self is a kind of delusion. 
According to Peter Harvey, in early Buddhism the no-self doctrine is a rejection of the conception
of self present in Brahmanical Upanishads and in Jain texts.  He claims that it is a mistake to
interpret the doctrine as explicitly asserting that there is no self, as this way of conceptualizing it
short-circuits the process of coming to fully understand the doctrine: “the not-Self teaching is not
4 “The Characteristic of Nonself,” in trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Connected
Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya, (Boston: Wisdom
Publications, 2000), 901-903.  SN 22.59 (PTS: S iii 66).
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a bald denial of Self, but a persistent undermining of any attempt to take anything as “Self,” and thus
be attached to it.  It is a contemplative strategy to induce, in the end, a letting go of everything.”5  
This “contemplative strategy” view of the doctrine subordinates ontology to  pragmatics.  The
point of the doctrine is to advance a method of coming to see more clearly the absence of an essential
self in one’s experience; the ethical implications are therefore primarily existential.  On this
interpretation, no-self is a technique of perception,6 it endorses metaphysical quietism about the self,
and is more like practical reasoning (reasoning aimed at what to do) than theoretical reasoning
(reasoning governing belief).  This quietist interpretation of the doctrine accords with the Buddha
of the Pali Canon’s refusal to answer the question whether or not there is a self7 when asked outright,
and with the Majjhima Nikaya’s description of the person inappropriately caught in either the
conviction that she has a self, or the conviction that she has no-self as in a “thicket of views, a
wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views.”8  When
Vacchagotta questions the Buddha as to whether or not the soul and body are the same the Buddha
5 Peter Harvey, “Theravada Philosophy of Mind and the Person,” in Buddhist
Philosophy: Essential Readings, eds. William Edelglass and Jay Garfield, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 267.
6 Ven. Thanissaro Bhikkhu argues for anatta as a “technique of perception” in “No-
self or Not-self?”, in Noble Strategy (Valley Center, Ca.: Metta Forest Monastery Publisher,
1999), 71-4. 
7 “Ananda (Is There a Self?)”, in trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Connected Discourses
of the Buddha: A Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya, (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000),
1393-4. SN 44.10.  By “quietism” I refer to the position in contemporary analytic philosophy that
rejects the development of substantive philosophical theories, proposing instead that
philosophical inquiry at best rids us of confusion, but does not provide knowledge.    
8 “All the taints,”in trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Middle
Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya, 3rd edition (Boston:
Wisdom Publications, 2009), 91-96.
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replies only that the speculation that soul and body are the same or different is a fetter of views beset
by suffering - speculation is something that the Buddha has “put away”.9
But while Early Buddhism advised against deeper inquiry into the nature of the self, all
Mahayana texts are not steadfastly quietist.  Scholars of Buddhism tell us that Asvaghosa’s
Buddhacarita is among the first extant Buddhist texts to explicitly claim that there is no self.10
Santideva’s metaphysics of no-self in the Bodhicaryavatara  offers a clear statement of no-self: “The
notion ‘it is the same me even then’ is a false construction, since it is one person who dies, quite
another who is born.”11  According to Santideva, the impersonal badness of suffering shows the
irrationality of valuing my own suffering over the suffering of others’ and helps us to see that we
stand in the same relation to our future self that we stand in relation to others.  For good reason this
position has been compared to Derek Parfit’s analysis of the self.  As my philosophical focus is not
whether the move beyond quietism is legitimated or required, but is rather how the analysis of the
doctrine is shaped by the standpoint (theoretical or practical) brought to bear on the analysis, I will
bypass these metaphysical and interpretive issues.  Is the anatta doctrine completely explained by the
(so called) metaphysical facts, or does it allow, or even require that the question of whether or not
the self is real be addressed from the standpoint of practical reason?
9 “Aggivacchagotta Sutta,” in trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, The
Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya, 3rd edition
(Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2009), 590-602.
10 Richard Robinson, Willard Johnson, and Thanissaro Bhikkhu, Buddhist
Religions: A Historical Introduction, 5th edition.  (Toronto: Wadsworth Publishing, 2005), 91. 
11 Santideva, Excerpt from the Bodhicaryavatara in William Edelglass and Jay
Garfield eds., Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings.  (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009), 388-399.
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To see the relevance of this distinction consider Charles Goodman’s view that a proper and
complete understanding of the no-self doctrine leads to a theoretical, metaphysical stance which
imposes constraints on ethical practice, and requires a consequentialist meta-ethic.12  Goodman
understands the doctrine to reject the reality of all composite entities, including persons, the relations
between parts and whole being a function of how they are conceived by minds.  Composite things
can be said to exist as conventional truths, as they feature usefully in our lives, but selves and other
composite entities “do not exist from the perspective of ultimate truth.”13  Goodman’s interpretation
of the doctrine rejects metaphysical quietism, claiming no self as a metaphysical truth.  Like Parfit,
he holds that consequentialist ethical implications follow from this metaphysical fact.  Because there
are not ultimately any experiencers it cannot matter who experiences particular benefits and burdens,
so we can ignore the distributive effects of our actions and simply maximize the good.14  
However, we can agree with Goodman that we lack  warrant for belief in an essentialist, non-
composite view of the self without granting the necessity of the metaphysical claim or its normative
consequences.  The metaphysical interpretation of the no-self doctrine does entail that harms cannot 
ultimately be regarded as mine or theirs, but does not entail either that harms should be diminished,
12 It should be noted that not all Mahayana approaches to the no-self doctrine are put
in straightforwardly metaphysical terms.  Some, relying on the doctrine of upaya, or skillful
means, introduce a comprehensive strategy which acknowledges that teachings of the Buddha
and Boddhisatvas will be adapted to the capacities of the hearers in order to be effective and of
benefit.
13 Charles Goodman, The Consequences of Compassion (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 11.
14 He writes:  “Once we bring to bear on ethics the teaching that there are no
metaphysically important differences between different sentient beings, it cannot ultimately
matter whether harms are compensated by benefits to the same beings or to others; nor can it
ultimately matter who it is that carries out a harmful action.” Goodman, 97.  
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or that the good should be maximized.  From a theoretical stance, we might just give up on the
notion of ethical obligations; if there are no agents there can be no sensible talk of moral
responsibility, and no moral good that ought to be promoted.15  Similarly there is no logical
entailment from the truth of no-self to indiscriminate concern for all states of affairs.  Those
committed to diminishing suffering are likely to find it helpful to develop a diminished sense of the
self, but the commitment is not forced upon us by metaphysics.  Buddhist ethics supports the claim
that the internalization of no-self will lead to the development of compassion, but we should not
assume that the justification for compassion lies entirely in the logic or metaphysics of no-self.16  The
question of what ought to be believed, or attended to in thought, cannot be fully answered without
acknowledging the practical standpoint.  Recall that in Kalamas Sutta, the Buddha responds to the
Kalamas’ expressed confusion over the differing doctrines advanced and criticized by visiting
Brahmins and contemplatives by telling them to focus on what they find to be skillful and unskillful
in their experience and to avoid supposing that doctrine is authoritative.17
It should be clear that the contemplative strategy interpretation of the doctrine, while not
15 I am not here claiming that Goodman cannot account for moral responsibility, just
claiming that nothing about the good is entailed by the metaphysical reading of the no-self
doctrine. 
16 Owen Flanagan makes this point in his, The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism
Naturalized (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2011), 131.
17 “Now look you, Kalamas.  Be ye not misled by report or tradition or hearsay.  Be
not misled by proficiency in the collections, nor by mere logic or inference, nor after
consideration reasons, nor after reflection on and approval of some theory, nor because it fits
becoming, nor out of respect for a recluse (who holds it).  But, Kalamas, when you know for
yourselves: These things are unprofitable, these things are blameworthy, these things are
censured by the intelligent; these things when performed and undertaken, conduce to loss and
sorrow – then indeed do ye reject them, Kalamas.”  “Kalama Sutta,” trans. F.L. Woodward,
Anguttara-Nikaya, (Oxford: The Pali Text Society, 2000), pp.171-172, PTS: A i 188.
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denying the significance of metaphysics, nonetheless denies that metaphysics alone settles the issue. 
The agent, faced with the question of what she is to do, how she is to think about what is likely to
happen, or what has happened, faces a choice.  No-self forms of thinking about how a situation is
being perceived and how it should be responded to, are means for identifying and reducing stress and
suffering.  On the contemplative strategy view, what will be of interest is whether the sense of self
is skillful or unskillful with respect to recognizing and responding to suffering, and the question of
what is skillful or wholesome (kusala) is not the same as the question of whether or not the self is
metaphysically real.  There are clearly times when it would be unskillful for a person to see herself
as simply a series of happenings and not as an agent.  For example, in the wake of the uncomfortable
feeling one might experience after having lied out of self-interest, it would not be skillful to take
refuge in the sense of oneself as simply having been subject to a dishonest experience.  We are
notoriously prone to describing ourselves and our experiences as happenings when we are trying to
avoid responsibility, so the question of when it is appropriate to relate to one’s experiences as a
series of happenings without self-identification is rather complicated.
If the arguments of this section are convincing it should be clear that the practical standpoint
is significant in a discussion of the no-self doctrine, that it supports the contemplative strategy
interpretation, and that the doctrine of no-self per se does not support consequentialist ethics. 
II.  The Self in Kantian Thought
In this section I will argue that the limits Kant places on theoretical knowledge of the self,
along with his moral duty to understand the empirical self, can be seen as structurally similar to the
contemplative strategy interpretation of the no-self doctrine.  Kant’s focus on the empirical sense of
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self that accompanies action coheres with the Buddhist recognition that the senses of self that we
inhabit are deeply important aspects of our moral development.   
Roughly put, Kant is famous in Western philosophy for seeing a way beyond theories of the
mind and world which resulted in problematic gaps between the world and our ideas of it.  If in
perception we are acquainted with subjective representations of the world, then the world may be
entirely other than we perceive it.  Moreover, if what we are aware of is only our ideas, then we
aren’t actually aware of the world at all.  Kant attempts to navigate a bridge which respects that we
are both subjects (experiencers of the world) and objects (parts of the world governed by natural
laws).  He holds that a representation is an object of subjectivity that is represented as empirically
real and transcendentally ideal.  From one standpoint it makes sense to say that the world as
perceived by us is real, and from another it makes sense to say that the world as perceived by us is
ideal.18  Kant demands that we acknowledge that our minds shape our experience and his critiques
are attempts to determine the limits of what we can know.
In brief, Kant holds that it cannot be known whether the self as a persistent, independent
thing, is ultimately real.  To know this one would have to be able to have access to things in
themselves (the noumenal) without the mind’s intervention, and this is impossible.19  Knowledge of
events in the realm of experience (the phenomenal) is possible if it respects that it is a description
of the realm of appearances.  Our experience is the experience of a “thinking thing”, the existence
18 Jay Garfield discusses the similarities between Kant’s transcendental idealism and
Vasubandhu’s Cittamatra Idealism in “Western Idealism through Indian Eyes,” in his Empty
Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation.  (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 152-169.
19 By contrast, the Buddhist position is that it is both possible and desirable to attain
access to a dimension unfabricated by the mind.
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of the self being known in relation to its thoughts which are “its predicates”, and this is the limit of
our knowledge of a persistent self.  In his discussion of whether the soul is substance in the
Paralogisms, Kant writes:  “Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is
represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X.  It is known only through the thoughts
which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept whatsoever, but can
only revolve in a  perpetual circle, since any judgement upon it has always already made use of its
representation.”20  
Kant argues that it must be possible for the “I think” to accompany one’s representations, for
in the absence of the “I think” there would be representations “which could not be thought at all, and
that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing
to me.”21  For the representations to be representations, a unification within consciousness seems
required; the “transcendental unity of apperception” operates as a unifier that makes coherent
conscious experience possible, making that experience mine.  In this sense we can think of a self
which transcends our empirical experience - to this extent a unified self is part of our experience. 
It could be that there is a substantial self (though we cannot know this) and Kant claims, while the
phenomenal realm indicates that we are governed by natural laws, unfree, and without a substantive
self, it is not self-contradictory to suppose that there might be free causality in the noumenal realm. 
Kant’s position thus respects a distinction between ultimate and conventional truths.
The relationship between noumenal and phenomenal selves is nonetheless a vexed part of
20 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), B404/A346.
21 Critique of Pure Reason, B131-2.
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Kant’s philosophy.  In places Kant himself makes claims about the noumenal which seem to overstep
his own limits to the bounds of knowledge.  For example, he brings Christian assumptions to his
analysis of the highest good (the ultimate end advanced by moral conduct), when in the Critique of
Pure Reason he claims that the convergence of happiness “distributed in exact proportion to
morality....is possible only in the intelligible world, under a wise Author and Ruler.”22  The attempt
to secure a kind of eternal justice of happiness in proportion to virtue, seems to privilege one of a
number of metaphysical possibilities.  The question of whether Kant’s considered judgement is that
highest good is brought about by God in another, non-natural world, or that the highest good it is
brought about in the natural world through human efforts is debated within Kant scholarship.23 
While Kant clearly recognizes the importance of identifying our limited knowledge about the self,
both in life and death, his own discussion, unsurprisingly, is conditioned by his cultural context.  It
is worth noting in the context of comparative philosophy, that one of Kant’s few references to non-
Western philosophy is a criticism of its failure to respect the limits of what can be known concerning
the self through eternity, and the highest good.  
In a  rare instance of cross-cultural reflection, Kant remarks on a type of no-self view in
Chinese philosophy, in his essay “The End of All Things.”  The remark is made in passing in a
satirical essay whose indirect target is religious censorship, and in which Kant promotes a liberal
Christian position, one that circumscribes what can be known about the afterlife and eternity. 
Brooding over unknowable final ends leads to mysticism, Kant writes, wherein “reason does not
22 Critique of Pure Reason, A811/B839.
23 Andrews Reath, for example, clearly distinguishes “secular” and “theological”
interpretation of the highest good as presented across Kant’s works.  “Two Conceptions of the
Highest Good in Kant,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 26(4), 1988, 593-619.
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understand either itself or what it wants, but prefers to indulge in enthusiasm rather than - as seems
fitting for an intellectual inhabitant of a sensible world - to limit itself within the bound of the
latter.”24  Here Kant describes as “monstrous” what he takes to be Lao-Tzu’s conception of the
highest good as nothingness itself: “that it consists in nothing, i.e., in the consciousness of feeling
oneself swallowed up in the abyss of the Godhead by flowing together with it, and hence by the
annihilation of one’s personality.”  He suggests that the pantheism of the Tibetans and other oriental
peoples arises from this commitment to nothingness and to the conviction that the self is ultimately
reabsorbed into the whole, and remarks that “in consequence from its philosophical sublimation
Spinozism is begotten.”25  It is, perhaps, ironic that Kant charges this non-Western philosophy with
disregarding the legitimate bounds of reason out of a desire for a blessed end of all things, an eternal
tranquility, when his own conception of the highest good as happiness in proportion to virtue is
fraught with Christian assumptions. 
To return to the main line of discussion, for the purpose of demonstrating a parallel between
Kantian and Buddhist metaphysics of the self, it will suffice here to note that Kant’s argued for
position is clear, we cannot know anything of the constitution of the soul “so far as the possibility
of its separate existence is concerned” nor can we know whether we exist as substance or as
accident.26  I am not here advancing a defense of Kant’s metaphysics, neither am I arguing that
Kant’s metaphysics is entirely analogous to Buddhist metaphysics.  As all comparative projects are
24 Immanuel Kant, “The End of All Things,” in Religion and Rational Theology,
trans. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
AK 8: 335. 
25 See the Spinoza chapter in this volume for a discussion of related issues.
26 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B420.
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shaped by specific interests, it is worth clarifying some disanalogies as well.
Kant claims to have determined the limits of our knowledge of the self, but the Buddhist
view of no-self does not make this claim.  On the contemplative strategy interpretation it is claimed
that an essential self does not exist, but it is not claimed that from the theoretical standpoint we see
the limits of what is knowable.  Rather, it claims that we are unwise to engage in deep metaphysical
speculation about the nature of the self beyond a certain point, and instead wise to find repeatedly
in our own experience the impermanence and instability of the self, the suggestion being that
metaphysical speculation obstructs a better understanding of the nature of the self.  So Kantian and
Buddhist commitments to quietism concerning the ultimate truth about the self have different
grounds, and different aims.  This difference, while noteworthy, should not lead us to overlook the
remarkable  similarities, which arise from a shared commitment to the standpoint of agency.  Neither
for Kant, nor for contemplative strategy accounts of no-self is the question of the nature of the self
to be fully determined by its metaphysics.  On both views, the nature of the self found in experience
demands attention and critical scrutiny.  To this topic I now turn. 
III.  Kant’s Contemplative Strategy
If we think of the contemplative strategy version of the no-self doctrine as a process in which
one engages in order to free oneself from delusion, to see things more objectively in order to promote
right action, then we find a clear parallel in Kant’s duty of self-knowledge. As outlined in the
Metaphysics of Morals, an agent’s two basic ends are self-perfection and the happiness of others. 
The duty of perfection involves the cultivation of one’s natural predispositions so that one’s will and
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understanding are developed in order to satisfy the requirements of duty.27  Of Kant’s specific duties
to the self, the first duty is to develop self-knowledge.  It is a wide duty to seek moral perfection:
“‘know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself,”...in terms of your moral perfection in relation to your duty. 
That is, know your heart – whether it is good or evil, whether the source of your actions is pure or
impure.”28  This moral self-knowledge provides the start of all human wisdom and is aptly described
by Kant as hellish but necessary.  
As Kant understands us, we are by nature dissemblers who, even when we attempt to
scrutinize our hearts, do not get easy or direct access to our own motives; we are prone to
‘discovering’ what we have ourselves put on view.29  Our vulnerability to the opinion of others
makes it impossible for a true self to be revealed and because our capacity for empirical self-
knowledge is deeply limited, Kant is not entirely optimistic about our prospects for self-knowledge. 
Still, despite his pessimism, Kant does not renounce self-knowledge but understands it to be a
necessary condition of moral development; it is a practical not a theoretical pursuit.    
Unlike most other thinkers in the Western tradition, Kant recognizes that it is dangerous to
ignore or leave unchecked the empirical sense of self accompanying one’s deeds.  He promotes the
development of an honest picture of oneself in action, one that counters the human tendency to
exaggerated self-promotion.  Accurate self-perceptions require that we observe our intentions and
avoid self-identification with our “mere wishes” which provide a  distorted sense of what we are like,
27 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), AK 6:386.
28 The Metaphysics of Morals, AK 6:441. 
29 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Robert
Louden, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), AK 7:133.
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our “pious ejaculations” being a better indication of how we like to think of ourselves, than what we
are actually like.30  Self- knowledge is a practical endeavor aimed at ridding oneself of false senses
of self and constructing increasingly skillful senses of self as they apply to the aim of moral action. 
While in Buddhism the aim is a selflessness that liberates one from suffering, for Kant the aim is an
agency free of the conceit that interferes with clear moral vision, sound judgement, and dutiful
action. 
Although his detractors like to present Kant as a fetishist about duty, there is point in his
emphasis on clear recognition of the ground of one’s action.  It is morally dangerous, for example,
to conflate the satisfaction of a basic duty with the feeling that one has done something noble.  It is
important to keep a close watch on our intentions and aspirations as they are strongly influenced by
the “dear self”31 and its improbably positive self-presentation.  Moreover, Kant recognizes that
awareness of one’s actions as selfless is morally fraught, when he criticizes moral enthusiasts (such
as religious fanatics) who lose sight of their obligations, focusing instead on the perceived merit of
their actions, and in so doing “flattering themselves with a spontaneous goodness of heart.”32  These
moral enthusiasts conflate the required satisfaction of the demands of duty with the pathological
feeling of moral prowess and thereby construct a false sense of their own magnificence that
diminishes virtue.  Hence, Kant warns against the “exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and
30 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath, eds. Peter Heath and J.B.
Schneewind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), AK 27:365.  
31 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), AK 4:408. 
32 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), AK 5:85. 
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magnanimous” when they are simply required.  
For Kant, the self-knowledge which is our first duty is not theoretical knowledge regarding
a metaphysical self, it is rather an internal self-accounting aimed at the production of a more
authentic or autonomous self.  Moral self-knowledge functions to remove the evil which is an
obstacle to the natural development of a good will, and it helps both to destroy self-contempt and
“egotistical self-esteem”. Of course Buddhist philosophy does not suppose that humans are innately
evil, merely that we have defilements, and the details of the Kantian and Buddhist accounts of
delusion differ greatly, as do their accounts of objectivity and right action.  But it is noteworthy that
for Kant “evil” is a kind of corruption of the person marked by the subordination of morality to self-
conceit, and that it is “radical” in the sense that all other evils stem from it. Both within Buddhist and
Kantian ethics, ethical agency requires the cultivation and purification of the mind and heart, and this
requires self-knowledge.
Kantian self-knowledge promotes the demise of mental habits that obstruct morality.  As a
kind of contemplative strategy it involves forms of recognition and de-identification with what might
be thought of as deluded, or unskillful self-conceptions (including self-aggrandizement,
righteousness, self-conceit, magnanimity, and so on).  A more refined self-conception is constructed
over time by identifying with the thought of giving others their due, obedience to the moral law, and
sympathy for the plight of others.  This sort of moral development is social and includes attention
to, and refinement of, character traits through emotional development.  The conditional duty to
develop sympathetic feelings (joy and sadness), for example, is described by Kant as a means of
promoting benevolence by utilizing our natural tendencies to sympathy with others in order to
achieve what “the representation of duty alone would not accomplish”.  He explains that it is “a duty
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not to avoid the places where the poor who lack the most basic necessities are to be found but rather
to seek them out, and not to shun sick-rooms or debtor’s prisons and so forth in order to avoid
sharing painful feelings one may not be able to resist.”33  Clearly Kant recognizes that moral
emotions shape an agent’s experience for good or ill and that they need to be cultivated accordingly. 
In Buddhist thought vices are tied to misperceptions or wrong view, a failure of right thinking which
promotes suffering.  Interestingly, Kant identifies the vice of envy as a kind of misperception.  It “is
a propensity to view the well-being of others with distress, even though it does not detract from one’s
own” and so envy counts as a kind of malevolence, grounded in the mistake of comparing one’s
well-being with that of others, instead of acknowledging one’s own intrinsic worth.  
 Kant’s account of this phenomenal self is not naive; neither is it as sophisticated as its
Buddhist counterpart.  Kant fails to recognize that self-loathing is detrimental to morality, and over-
estimates the constructive capacities of the thought of duty.34  Nonetheless, his account of the duty
of self-knowledge has noteworthy Buddhist affinities.  It is not easy to acquire, given self-conceit. 
It is not awareness of a permanent self, and it is skillful when it serves to diminish a sense of self that
is an obstacle to duty and recognition of what is, for example, owed to others.  The view that agents
need to become aware of the sense of the self that accompanies our moral actions, and that it needs
to be refined in order to promote objectivity and moral action is part of what motivates the
contemplative strategy interpretation of the no-self doctrine.  Whether or not there is a self from the
perspective of the ultimate dimension is relevant to this project only to the extent that it is useful to
33 The Metaphysics of Morals, AK 6:457.
34 I have argued for this in "Kant and the Buddha on Self-Knowledge," in Stephen R.
Palmquist (ed.), Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
2010), 695-708. 
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think of oneself in no-self terms.   
IV.  Self-Legislation and Self-Identity: 
It might be objected that the Kantian focus on agency is difficult to square with Buddhist
philosophy, that the contemplative strategy reading of the doctrine seems inconsistent with the
Kantian focus on agency in two ways.  First, even granting that Kant advances a distinction between
the conventional and the ultimate, the Kantian appeal to synthetic apriori truths forces Kant and
Kantians to commit to the noumenal as the real source of morality.  If understood as a technique of
perception, it seems that the no-self doctrine problematically divorces the phenomenal self from the
noumenal in the activity of practical reason.  If the ultimate self is the rational will, and free action
is action governed by pure practical reason, then free, moral action is action governed by the
intellect.  This may be thought to be antithetical to a Buddhist conception of moral action, which
does not hold reason in similarly high regard.  Along these lines, Charles Goodman has argued that
Kant’s self must identify with the rational will, not with anything empirical, and that this seems to
be at odds with Buddhist thinking which neither conceives of the ultimate self as reason, nor
conceives of freedom as rule by reason.35  However, it is not clear that Kant’s conception of morality
requires identification with the noumenal.   
Julian Wuerth, for example, draws on an extensive range of Kant’s writings to argue that
Kant’s own account of practical agency allows for free action from sensibility and does not equate
35 Goodman, 201.
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action that is not governed by pure practical reason with unfree, immoral action.36  The issue is
significant because if Kant holds that free, moral action is the action of the noumenal self (because
it is governed by pure practical reason), then it is unclear how people can legitimately be held
responsible for immoral actions, as they are unfree.  As my purpose here is neither a defense of
Kant's metaphysics, nor engagement with disputed ideas in Kant scholarship, I will set aside the
issue of whether or not Kant's own position founders on its aprioristic metaphysics.  The point of
this Buddhist, Kantian comparison is not to claim that the theories have identical, unproblematic,
metaphysics of the self, nor is it to claim that Buddhist ethics is structurally Kantian.  Kant’s account
of the noumenal self and agency doesn’t forestall a fruitful comparison with Buddhist thought. 
Indeed, the relation between the phenomenal and the noumenal is not unlike the relation between
present selves tied by karmic consequences to future selves.  So the first objection does not derail
the Kantian, Buddhist comparison.   
The second objection to the comparison I have presented is that the Kantian focus on agency
as self-legislation in the phenomenal realm opposes Buddhist ways of thinking about ethics; Kant
and Kantians understand practical reasons as law-like modes of self-causality, while Buddhist ethics
encourages us to be wary of forming rigid identities, which must be after all, grounded in delusion. 
To see why this objection doesn’t pose a problem for the Kantian, Buddhist comparison recall
Korsgaard’s Kantian position on personal identity.  In response to the view that the self is best
understood as a series of happenings, she argues that the lack of a deep metaphysical self does not
36 Wuerth argues that thinkers like Henry Sidgwick and Christine Korsgaard have
failed to properly mark Kant’s distinction between Wille and Willkur, and that this has led to
confusion about Kant’s position.  “Sense and Sensibility in Kant’s Practical Agent: Against the
Intellectualism of Korsgaard and Sidgwick,” European Journal of Philosophy, 21(1), 2010, 1-36. 
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force the conclusion that there is no self.  Firstly, the practical necessity of eliminating motivational
conflict in this body provides a practical reason regarding myself as the same self in the future. 
Secondly, from standpoint of deliberative choice we require reasons which express commitments
which shape the responses of our future selves.  In this manner we are by nature self-legislating, and
it is in self-legislation that we create identities; this defense of the self is consistent with the claim
that the self is not metaphysically deep.37 
On Korsgaard’s Kantian view of agency, to determine your actions through self-legislation
is to give expression to a way in which you value yourself, sometimes as a friend, or feminist, or
parent, or perhaps as a citizen of the kingdom of ends.38  These practical identities make our reasons
apparent to us partly through self-awareness.   To be a loyal, sympathetic friend, for example, is not
to cold-heartedly apply the rule of sympathy in friendship to one’s situation.  Rather, it is to find
oneself searching for a way of understanding of a friend’s predicament and to have one’s sense of
self rebel against the inclination, say, to blame her for being foolish.  A friend who lacked this sense
of loyalty would not experience the tendency to blame as problematic; to invest in loyal friendship
is to leave oneself open to finding oneself engaged in disloyal activities.  Identities are created
around the laws we give ourselves and  may be morally skillful or unskillful ways of perceiving
37 As Mark Siderits notes, the reductionist version of the no-self doctrine denies that
persons are completely distinct existences but does not deny the distinctness of the causal series
that a person may experience as herself.  So it makes sense to designate one series as me and the
other as you by reference to the relations between earlier and later parts of the series. Buddhism
as Philosophy:  An Introduction (Indianapolis, Indiana:  Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.,
2007), 83.
38 This form of identity is practical in that it marks “a description under which you
find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.” Christine Korsgaard,
The Sources of Normativity.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 101.
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ourselves.  To think of ourselves as law-governed in this way is not to suppose that we are rule-
bound extremists who lack the capacity to recognize how and when these practical identities conflict. 
To be a thoughtful citizen and parent, for example, is to be open to feeling the competing demands
of those identities when they conflict, as they surely will.     
Charles Goodman has objected to Korsgaard, arguing that her conception of self-legislation
promotes a self that Buddhism cannot endorse, as her agents will be bound by their own rules even
when they should clearly abandon them: “if I view a particular decision rule as expressive of my self,
I will be unwilling to abandon that rule, and make decisions in accordance with another rule, even
when switching decision rules would produce much better consequences.”39  He sees the identities
that naturally arise as we engage in self-legislation as obstructions to morality because he supposes
them to be inflexible and dogmatically imposed.  Goodman acknowledges that while the
phenomenology of deliberation suggests that there is someone involved in choice, that long-term
planning involves an extended sense of self, and even acknowledges that a functional unity of the
person seems required for action, but goes on to assert that philosophers in the Buddhist tradition
simply deny that the practical standpoint is the only or best way to live.  By contrast, he writes,
Buddhism demands “rejecting and abandoning the psychological processes that, for Korsgaard, help
to constitute a persisting self.”40  In this respect Buddhist philosophy and Kantian philosophy are
clearly at odds.  The alternative to the practical standpoint, he writes, is the enlightened state, in




intuitive insight, which clearly sees how things are.”41
But Goodman’s objection fails to recognize that the tendency to be caught by one’s identity
and act badly as a result isn’t a problem merely for Kantian theory, it is a problem for all moral
actors. This is what it is like to be a person, not what it is like to be a Kantian.  All agents are prone
to acting from false perceptions of their situation and of themselves.  With this Buddhist philosophy
is entirely in agreement.  Furthermore, the appeal to the possibility of enlightenment does not defeat
the Kantian position that an agentially constituted self (or series of selves) can be pragmatically
vindicated and is unavoidable for natural, rational creatures like us.  Because life for all non-
enlightened beings includes the construction of selves, morality for non-enlightened beings involves
identity creation, and this can be usefully illuminated by the contemplative strategy interpretation
of the no-self doctrine.  Kantian agency and self-legislation are  not undermined by the doctrine of
no-self.  
In conclusion, I have argued that the standpoint of agency has a place in our comparative
studies of the nature of the self, and that it underlies some of the tension between the contemplative
strategy and the metaphysical interpretations of the no-self doctrine.  It is important that the
contemplative strategy view be part of our comparative discussion, not only because it has a
plausible textual defense, but also because it accords with the existential heart of Buddhism’s
soteriological project.  The contemplative strategy interpretation of the no-self doctrine allows for
clear parallels to be drawn between Kantian and Buddhist philosophy, specifically the importance
of moral self-development by way of self-knowledge.  Considered from the standpoint of agency,
the doctrine of no-self illuminates aspects of moral psychology involved in the purification of the
41 Goodman, 212.
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heart and mind that might have otherwise gone unnoticed.    
